ABSTRACT Different from the traditional Internet-of-Things (IoT) architecture, information-centric IoT is a novel paradigm in which changes are made to the entire network stack, from layer 3 up to the application layer. IC-IoT is built on top of named data networking (NDN), a content-centric Internet paradigm whose features are particularly promising for certain IoT applications, such as smart grid. In IC-IoT, privacy is one of the most challenging issues. Among existing privacy-preserving approaches, differential privacy (DP) is a powerful tool that can provide privacy-preserving noisy query answers over statistical databases and has been widely adopted in many practical fields. In particular, as an enhanced implementation of DP, randomized aggregable privacy-preserving ordinal response (RAPPOR) can achieve strong privacy, high-efficiency, and high-utility guarantees for each client string in data crowdsourcing. However, in many IoT applications like smart grid, data are often processed in batches. Developing a new random response algorithm that can support batch-processing will make it more efficient and suitable for IoT applications than existing random response algorithms. In this paper, we propose a new randomized response algorithm that can achieve differential-privacy and utility guarantees for consumer's behaviors and can process one batch of data at each time. First, by applying sparse coding in this algorithm, a behavior signature dictionary is created from the aggregated energy consumption data in IoT. Then, we add noise into the behavior signature dictionary by the classical randomized response techniques to achieve the differential privacy after data re-aggregation. Through security analysis with the principle of differential privacy and experimental performance evaluation, we prove that our proposed algorithm can preserve consumer's privacy without compromising utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the pervasive presence around us of a variety of things that constitute our world [1] . IoT is a novel paradigm that is rapidly gaining ground in the scenario of machine to machine (M2M) communications that make intelligent sensors and smart objects working together. IoTs have developed significantly and they have been incorporated in various fields, such as smart grid [2] - [3] . In smart grid, billions of IoT devices are connected to the Internet. As a result, the huge amount of data generated need to be transmitted over the network. Another feature is that as a traditional time-sensitive IoT applications, smart grid has limited tolerance on time delay. Otherwise, it will have a negative impact on safety and emergency response. Improving the capacity of the underlying network is the key solution in smart grid.
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is regarded as a promising approach to overcome the shortcomings of the current IP-address based network architecture [4] . ICN has been proposed to improve the quality of information perceived by consumers via Named Data Networking (NDN) or the Content-Centric Networking (CCNx) [5] . ICN's primary characteristics include in-network caching, naming FIGURE 1. Power usage to personal activity mapping. Analyzing the aggregated household energy consumption data in a 15 minutes interval can disclose the usage of most major home appliances [9] . the contents, better mobility, improved security and scalable information delivery which are intrinsically suitable for IoT applications.
As an extension of ICN, Information-centric IoT (IC-IoT) is a novel paradigm of great significance that has been considered a promising network architecture for the smart grid [6] , [7] . However, there are still some problems that need to be addressed.
Privacy is one of the most popular research topics in IC-IoT and smart grid [8] . The analysis is conducted over a considerable amount of data, sensed and collected from the users. For example, in smart grid, Non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM), or energy dis-aggregation, is the process of deducing which appliances are currently being used, by analyzing the power signal of the whole-house power meters [9] . As shown in Figure 1 , the Non-intrusive Load Monitoring is to obtain the load mark of each electric equipment from the learned decomposition, and to identify the load of each electric equipment. Fundamentally, NILM is an application of machine learning. It depends on many supervised learning and unsupervised learning algorithms. The typical NILM system makes use of whole-house data acquired from a single meter [10] . Similar to crowdsourcing, privacy protection against NILM might be solved by DP and RAPPOR. Fig1 illustrates how frequent meter readings may leak a detailed timeline of activities and could also lead to the disclosure of specific equipment usage or other internal home/business processes.
Various approaches have been proposed to protect the personal information of IoT users [11] . Actually, numerous works have studied the privacy preservation in smart grid. Traditional schemes can be mainly classified into the following three aspects. Firstly, homomorphic encryption [12] is a common solution to preserve consumer's privacy. However, it will introduce a heavy computational overhead and always need a third party for random secret distribution [13] . Secondly, battery-based load hiding (BLH) method is to hide the actual electricity consumption data of appliances by charging and discharging the battery [14] , but the environmental effects and cost caused by chargeable battery can't be ignored. DP has been applied in IoT to protect customers' privacy. Existing differential privacy schemes in smart grid mainly focus on the individual energy consumption data [15] , [16] and adding noise into the energy consumption data is the common solution to provide differential privacy. Nevertheless, the noisy data may affect the datautility and have a bad impact on several services such as electricity billing in smart grid.
Differential privacy [17] - [19] constitutes a strong standard for privacy guarantees in statistical databases. Due to its property of rigid and provable privacy guarantee, differentially private database mechanisms can make confidential data widely available for accurate data analysis and data statistics. A privacy mechanism is an algorithm that could produce an output string according to an input database and a series of queries. The common example is noisy counting: releasing of the number of records in a data set perturbed by symmetric Laplace mechanism, exponential mechanism or Randomized Response. Although the traditional Laplace mechanism is applicable to numerical query results, in many practical applications, query results are logical objects [19] .
A recent privacy-preserving crowdsourcing mechanism, Randomized Aggregable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response (RAPPOR) [20] , proposed in 2014, has substantially improved the statistical crowdsourcing technology. Since then, RAPPOR has been adopted and enhanced by many researchers to generate specialized Randomized Response algorithms that can be used in specific fields, such as machine learning [21] - [23] .
RAPPOR may be used to solve the problem of privacy protection in smart grid which shares some similarity with the crowdsourcing environment. As the next-generation power system, smart grid is a special Internet of things system that is envisioned to provide efficient and reliable energy delivery [24] . To realize fine-grained optimization and realtime management for energy supply, numerous smart meters are installed at the consumers' homes to gather the energy consumption data at high frequency and upload the data to the control center [25] . However, these detailed data usually include privacy-sensitive information with regard to the consumer's power consumption patterns, which raises the consumer's concerns about behavioral privacy [9] . RAPPOR provides strong privacy, high-efficiency, and highutility guarantees for each client string in data crowdsourcing. It is an intuitive idea to apply RAPPOR for differential privacy in the IoT context. However, in this case, both Basic RAPPOR and one-time RAPPOR need to use Bloom filter that can hash a string or very few bits each time. However, for massive batches of data and sometimes variable-length data, RAPPOR is not efficient [21] .
In practical IC-IoT application like smart grid, the terminal devices often need to process data by batch. For example, smart meter collects energy consumption data and sends it out every 15 minutes. Although RAPPOR is a good tool of differential privacy, it is hard to process data in IC-IoT.
In this paper, we propose an improved randomized response algorithm based on sparse coding named SCRAPPOR that can protect consumer's privacy from behavior signatures. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) The proposed algorithm is applicable for privacy protection of IoT. Differing from traditional differential private approaches, we generate randomized response noise via the improved RAPPOR to achieve an acceptable tradeoff between data utility and privacy.
(2) The key to the design is that we propose a behavior signature modeling method based on sparse coding instead of boom filter. After some lightweight trainings using the energy consumption data, the dictionary will be associated with the behavior characteristics of the electric appliances. The dictionary learning is sparse.
(3) At last, the performance of our scheme is compared with the state of the arts. The experimental results show that our algorithm can achieve a good balance between data-utility and privacy, hence is better applicable to IoT applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related work and background. In section III, our algorithm is presented in detail. In section IV, theoretical analysis about security and utility are given. In section V, the performance of our algorithm is evaluated. In section VI, the paper is concluded.
II. RELATED WORK A. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Dwork has proposed the notion of differential privacy for privacy-preserving in statistical datasets [15] . In addition, she has also proposed how to realize differential privacy by noise addition [18] . McSherry [26] studied the property of the parallel composition and stable transformation in differential privacy. Kifer [27] analyzed the privacy-utility tradeoff and provided the metrics for data-utility. Differential privacy in smart grid has been discussed in [14] , and the fault-tolerance problem during data aggregation has been analyzed in [13] . Barbosa et al. [28] proposed to apply the differential privacy against NILM to protect the data collected by smart meters.
1) DEFINITION OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
M is a privacy mechanism. For any datasets D 1 and D 2 , differing from at most one element, M satisfies ε -differential privacy if the two datasets satisfy the following condition:
The smaller the value of ε is, the higher the degree of privacy preservation can be achieved.
2) PROPERTY1: PARALLEL COMPOSITION [26] M 1 , M 2 . . . M n are different privacy mechanisms with the privacy budgeting parameters ε 1 , ε 2 . . . ε n . Then, the com-
3) PROPERTY2: STABLE TRANSFORMATIONS [26] For any two databases E and F, we say T provides c-stable if it meets the following condition.
If the privacy preserving mechanism M provides ε differential privacy and T is a c-stable transformation, the combination of M × T provides ε × c differential privacy.
B. RANDOMIZED RESPONSES
Randomized Response [29] is a survey technique developed in the 1960s for collecting statistics on sensitive topics where survey respondents wish to retain confidentiality.
Erlingsson et al. [20] proposed RAPPOR as a differential privacy machine and answered how to recover distributional parameters from the responses. RAPPOR becomes a widely used differential privacy approach. Fanti [21] proposed an improved algorithm to deal with multiple bits jointly. Vinterbo [22] extended RAPPOR to n-dimensional.
RAPPOR performs the following steps: Firstly, hash client's value onto the Bloom filter using specific hash functions.
Then let
, with probability 1 2 f 0, with probability 1 2 f x i , with probability 1 − f x i represents the original energy consumption data.
x i represents the data after being obfuscated by RAPPOR. f represents the a user-tunable parameter controlling the level of longitudinal privacy guarantee.
Last, send the generated report to the server.
C. SPARSE CODING
Sparse coding, also called sparse dictionary learning, is a kind of method to build a dictionary comprised of elements that can be approximated using a combination of atoms [30] , [31] . It has multiple variances such as nonnegative sparse coding [32] , Fast Convolutional Sparse Coding [33] , Shift-Invariance Sparse Coding [34] , and has been applied in many fields like audio classification and source separation [34] - [36] . In the field of smart grid, Kolter et al. [37] extended the sparse coding to improve the accuracy of a large-scale energy disaggregation task and uses a training dataset of electricity signals from different devices across several homes. Elhamifar and Sastry [30] designed a method based on sparse coding to extract signature consumption pattern. Jenatton et al. [36] proposed an optimal method for the regularization of hierarchical sparse coding. Singh and Majumdar [38] proposed a greedy deep sparse coding for energy disaggregation. The aim of sparse coding is to find dictionary B i ∈ R t×n such that the input vector x i can be represented as a linear VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. As shown in (a), for some consumers in a region at a certain instant of time, the adversary may learn a certain consumer's consumption data and then infer the consumer's behaviors and habits. As shown in (b), for a consumer over a period of time, the adversary may learn the switch state of each appliance by NILM and then infer the consumer's behaviors and habits. (a) attack model I from [18] . (b) attack model II from [9] . combination of n basis functions as follows.
Here, B i denotes the dictionary, and the number of basis function n is larger than the dimension of data x i . The activation matrix A i ∈ R n×1 is sparse, which means the sets of activations contain mostly zero entries. The sparse coding cost function is defined as follows.
||Y || F represents the Frobenius norm of Y and the value of F is always set to two in sparse coding. C represents a constant. B j i denotes the jth column of matrix B i . For a dataset X composed of v elements, the sparse coding can be shown as follows. λ denotes the weight of sparsity.
III. FRAMEWORK AND ALGORITHM A. DESIGN GOAL
In general, as shown in Figure 2 , the objective of the attacker is to infer household activities from the power consumption data.
Specifically, the attack model is (1) With the total energy consumption of all consumers in a region at a certain time, inferring the consumption of a certain consumer.
(2) With the total energy consumption of a consumer over a period of time, inferring the behavior of that consumer Inherited from Barbosa's design goals [28] , our schemes focus on the following aspects:
(1) Enabling the calculation of the total consumption of a consumer over a period of time (e.g., monthly billing); (2) Enabling the calculation of the total consumption of all consumers in a region at a certain instant of time; (3) Avoiding the measurement of the instantaneous consumption of an individual consumer at a certain instant of time.
Besides, we also propose two new design goals. (4) Providing ε-differential privacy without generating a serious impact on the data-utility.
(5) The obfuscated data should not be far from the original data and produce as little outlier number as possible, such as negative.
B. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
As shown in figure. 3, the algorithm takes in the real energy consumption data, and performs the following steps:
(1) Train the dictionaries (basis functions) This step can be completed by an IoT terminal device using historical data as the training set. If the electric utility data is trusted by customers, the dictionaries can be trained from electric utility data that are sent to the fog. Although the cost of training may be time-consuming, this work does not need to be carried out repeatedly and can be executed at the more powerful fog layer.
(2) Sparse coding This step can be completed by the IC-IoT transmitter device regularly (e.g., 15 minutes), along with the data collected from the smart meter.
(3) Randomized response This step can be completed by the IC-IoT transmission device.
(4) Data re-aggregation. This step can be completed by the IC-IoT transmission device.
(5) Report. Send the generated report S to the server. This step can be completed by the IC-IoT transmitter device. An end-to-end connection will be established between the smart meter and the utility which can send noisy data.
C. SPARSE CODING
The energy consumption data Y 1×t can be disaggregated by sparse coding as follows:
Here, t denotes the amount of time slots, which is one batch in the whole data set. n is the number of basic functions b, which is larger than t. The dictionary B t×n = [b 1 . . . b n ] is related to the energy consumption dynamics, corresponding to the different operation modes of a device. A n×1 is the activation matrix.
Dictionaries are the critical factor to sparse coding.
In IoT, efficient dictionary should be associated with the energy consumption data, switch state of the appliance and the behavior signature. Energy consumption data is collected from smart meters, which is a common IoT application considered in many schemes. The switch state of an appliance is the appliance consumption patterns (ON/OFF) of a particular consumer. The privacy-preserving requirement is that the application consumption patterns should not reflect a particular consumer's behavior at home, such as presence or absence, sleep-wake-cycles and other personal behaviors.
To achieve the desired goal using sparse coding, two important conditions must be satisfied:
The combining error must small.
The Activations matrix A n×1 is sparse
Element a i should be as close to 0 as possible.
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It's obvious that the random initial dictionary B is far away from this goal, hence a continuous optimization process is required.
D. TRAINING DICTIONARY
The process of training the dictionary is described as follows:
Firstly, define a suitable objective function with the dictionary B and activation A. Then, the objective function iterates, which solidifies and improves the dictionary B and activation A alternatively (solidifies the activation A and improves dictionary B, then solidifies the dictionary B and improve activation A). This process is repeated until convergence, in which dictionary B is appropriate.
The objective function is defined as follows.
Here, ||Y || F represents the Frobenius norm of Y and the value of F is always set to 2 in sparse coding. C represents a constant. B j i denotes the jth column of matrix B i .X is a dataset composed of v elements. λ denotes the weight of sparsity.
Here, ||Y t×1 − B t×n A n×1 || 2 2 represents the cost of datareconstruction.
f (A n×1 ) is the restrictive condition of activation matrix A n×1 , where A n×1 is a sparsity function which penalize a i for being far from zero. A typical choice is:
in which ||A n×t || 1 captures the sparsity condition The objective function based on sparse coding for the aggregated data sampling from v devices can be defined as
Given an energy consumption vector Y t×1 , to generate an acceptable dictionary, we train the dictionary as follows:
Firstly, we give an initial dictionaryB 0 . According to the energy consumption profile of each appliance' state, we get vector set {b 1 , b 2, . . . b n }. Each vector b j corresponds to the energy consumption dynamics in a different operation mode of a given device. As shown in figure. 3, for example, the energy consumption profiles of the fridge and washer dryer are intermittent and fluctuant even when they are at ON state. Additionally, the energy consumption profiles of a device in different operation models are not linear.
To find the representative basis function, we combine several continuous data segments to serve as the initial dictionary denoted byB 0 
Secondly, we input the initial dictionaryB 0 to estimate the new activations and the dictionary until convergence.
Here, δ 0 represents the upper bound of ratio 0 in Activation A
We also show the detailed process of dictionary training in Algorihm 1.
E. RANDOMIZED RESPONSE
To introduce the SCRAPPOR technology in detail, we first introduce a specific scenario.
We suppose that matrix A n×1 = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i } We started a sensitive question to attempt to track a i . For the query: q (a i ) = a i Machine needs to respond to this, but for privacy reasons, the user does not always respond the exact answer.
Instead, the machine answers the actual number in a certain probability 1 − f, and a false number in a certain probability f. The false number is chosen from A n×1 randomly.
For each energy consumption data batch Y, sparse coding is used to optimize Dictionary B through training. Then we can get activations A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n }.
Let 
where f is a user-tunable parameter controlling the level of longitudinal privacy guarantee related to the differential privacy. Step 1 InitializeB 0 andÂ 0
Step 2 Dictionary training: B ← training Sparse coding:
Step 3 computing A according to B A ← B Randomized Response:
Step 4 computing A according to A A ← A Data Re-aggregation:
Step 5 re-aggregation Y = BA Output: Y Let d k be the distance between input a k and output a k ,
The expectation and the variance can be calculated as
F. DATA RE-AGGREGATION
Based on the obfuscated activation and dictionary, we can generate the obfuscated energy consumption data Y as follows:
Since the sparse coding is a linear mapping, the final obfuscated data Y satisfies ε-differential privacy (proof is in the next section). However, the final obfuscated result may have a bad impact on the data-utility.
We also show the whole process of the algorithm in Algorihm2.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY ANALYSIS A. PRIVACY OF SPARSE CODING
Theorem 1: Sparse coding still satisfies ε differential privacy.
Proof: Let Y = y 1 , y 2 . . . , y k be a batch of energy consumption data. After sparse coding and re-aggregation, B and A are obtained. Y = BA, and Y = y 1 , y 2 . . . , y k is the randomized response generated by the algorithm according to Y .
Suppose that M is a privacy machine which satisfies ε -differential privacy,
The sparse coding algorithm can be viewed as a stable transformation T .
T : Y = B t×n A n×1
and Y − BA ≤ δ 2 , δ 2 is an infinitesimal small number close to 0. We suppose that Y = BA. So
After sparse coding, privacy machine M still satisfies ε -differential privacy.
Proof: Our scheme T can be expressed as follows:
in which the sparse coding T is c-stable and the value of c is 1.
According to the property2, transformation T a satisfies ε-differential privacy.
B. PRIVACY OF RANDOM RESPONSE ALGORITHM
Theorem 2: The random response algorithm satisfies ε-differential privacy. ε = ln (
x i , with probability 1 i f x k , with probability 1 − f RR is the bounded by e ε RR = P(y ∈ S|y = y 1 ) P(y ∈ S|y = y 2 )
considering the sparsity of activations A, most y = 0 VOLUME 6, 2018
when y = 0,
where p uv = Pr(X = v|X = u), denotes the probability that the randomized response is v when the respondent's true attribute value is u. We could infer that
A randomized query function q gives ε differential privacy, if for all data sets D 1 , D 2 such that one can be obtained from the other by modifying a single record, and all S ⊆ Range(k), it holds
In order to satisfy ε -differential privacy, we have
In this case, the distortion matrix will have the general form:
Let us denote by X the Activations Matrix containing the actual answer to the sensitive question. X can take i possible values. Due to the sparsity of matrices, many X values are 0. The randomized response X reported by the respondent instead of X follows a matrix of probabilities func will achieve its maximum value if and only if
Some researchers have published the data set of non-intrusive load monitoring for other researchers to use. The data set of household appliance was substantially published. Kolter and Johnson [39] firstly published the low frequency data of six household appliances and the high frequency data of two household electrical devices as well as the data set caused by the environment data, which is called Reference Energy Disaggregation Data Set (REDD). The example of the REDD is shown in Figure 4 . Anderson et al. [40] published the Buled data set; Barker et al. [41] published the UMass Smart * data set; Makonin et al. [42] published AMPds data set Batra et al. [43] published iAWE data set; Kelly and Knottenbelt [44] published UK-DALE database.
In this section, we use the REDD and the Smart * , to compare our algorithm with previous algorithms.
Reference Engergy Disaggreation Data Set (REDD) was present by Kolter in 2012. It is a data set containing the detailed power usage information from six homes, which is aimed at furthering research on energy disaggregation. REDD consists of whole-home and circuit/device specific electricity consumption for a number of real houses over several months' time. For each monitored house, REDD records (1) the whole home electricity signal at a high frequency (15kHz) (2) up to 24 individual circuits in the home, each labeled with its category of appliance or appliances, recorded at 0.5 Hz (plug-level monitors are recorded at 1 Hz). The UMASS Smart * Home Data Set contains high and low frequency readings from three homes but is not specifically designed for NILM evaluation.
B. TRAINING THE DICTIONARY
In our experiments with a i7-4700 CPU and 8GB memory server.
Firstly, we choose 300 signals as a batch. The 300 signal is the data size of 15 minutes. In practice, the smart meter sends out data every 15 minutes. And we choose 192 batches as a 300192's matrix. The 300192's matrix amounts to a data size of 48 hours.
Then we perform training using the method described in section III. The output generated is a 300192's matrix(dictionary). After 10000 iterations trained, the sparsity of dictionary achieves 99%. (1000 iterations trained, the sparsity of dictionary achieves 66%, and 15000 iterations trained, the sparsity of dictionary achieves 99.9% still).
The iterative convergence rate of FISTA is O (1/k 2 ) [47] , k is step of gradient descent. 10000 iterations of training take about 70min.
C. OBFUSCATION
After obfuscation, we could get the data shown in Figure 5 .
Experiments show clearly that the number of outliers generated by our algorithm is less than previous algorithms.
D. VALIDITY EVALUATION
The accuracy of the NILM will certainly be reduced by the data obfuscation. We evaluate the validity by comparing the accuracy of NILM after data obfuscation.
Researchers have proposed several load disaggregation algorithms and methods to evaluate the accuracy and performance of different load disaggregation algorithms.
The most widely used is F1-score proposed by Anderson et al. [45] which discussed the specific evaluation indexes regarding the detection method of the load disaggre- F1-score is an efficient metric to measure the privacypreserving level, which can be calculated as follows:
Here, Precision and Recall represent the positive predictive value and the recall sensitivity respectively. When the F1-score goes high, the application usage patterns can be tracked more accurately.
The commonality shared by Barbosa's scheme, Sankar's scheme and our scheme is the obfuscation of energy consumption data via noise addition. However, these schemes preserve consumer's privacy at different levels. Barbosa adds the noise into energy consumption data directly. Sankar and we add noise into the appliance consumption signatures. As shown in Table 1 , we add noise into each of the aforementioned algorithms to generate the obfuscated data and then calculate the F1-scores of fridge, light and washer dryer with FHMM algorithm. Thus, by adding noise into the energy consumption signature, our scheme has a better privacy-preserving level. The comparison between our algorithm and previous algorithms. As shown in (a), after obfuscation by our algorithm with the same privacy budget, most appliances' F1-scores are declining more than the previous algorithms. As shown in (b), after obfuscation by our algorithm with the same privacy budget, the error rate is less than pervious algorithms. (a) F1-score compare between ours algorithm and previous algorithms. (b) error comparison between our algorithm and previous algorithms.
E. UTILITY EVALUATION
As shown in Figure 6 , the statistics show that the error rate of our algorithm is no larger than other algorithms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a Randomized Response Algorithm using the sparse coding to replace the Boom filter. The algorithm can achieve differential privacy on batches of data. Additionally, it can better fulfill the trade-off between privacy and utility in the fog environment to protect IoT privacy. Therefore, the appliance consumption patterns can be masked even if the adversary has obtained the near realtime load profile. At last, we analyzed the feasibility of our scheme and compared it with other traditional algorithms in IoT. Our algorithm can also be applied to other fields. In the future, we will focus on extending the sparse coding to further preserve the user's privacy without compromising the data-utility.
